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A b s tr a c t .  An overview is presented of the state-of-the-art in model- 
based verification and validation of embedded systems, directed towards 
an industrial audience. Verification and validation consists in exploring 
the current design against properties expressed as p art of the require­
ments. It includes testing, model checking, runtim e verification and fault- 
diagnosis, and more exploratory techniques such as the use of theorem  
proving. During recent years, much progress has been made in theory, 
m ethods and tools for model-based verification and validation. In this 
paper, I will try  to  indicate for w hat type of practical problems it pays 
off to  apply one of these m odern techniques. Special attention  will be 
paid to  the results of six PROGRESS projects in this area.
1 In trodu ction
Embedded system s are highly specializable, often reactive, sub system s th a t pro­
vide, unnoticed by the user, inform ation processing and control tasks to  their 
em bedding system . Em bedded system s are om nipresent nowadays and make pos­
sible the creation of system s w ith a functionality  th a t cannot be provided by hu­
m an beings. Exam ple application areas are consum er electronic products (e.g. 
CD players, microwave ovens), telecom m unication (e.g. mobile phones), medical 
system s (e.g. pacem akers), traffic control (e.g. intelligent traffic lights), driving 
and car control (e.g. ABS), airborne equipm ent (e.g. fly-by-wire), and plant con­
tro l (e.g. packaging machines, wafer steppers). The term  em bedded system  thus 
encompasses a broad class of systems, ranging from simple m icrocontrollers to  
large and complex m ulti-processor and d istribu ted  systems. The huge economic 
im portance of em bedded system s is undisputed.
Some characteristics of em bedded system s are:
— Complex in teraction w ith the environm ent. Em bedded system s can only be 
designed and analyzed if one takes the behavior of their environm ent into 
account. Frequently th is environm ent is highly nondeterm inistic and in trin ­
sically continuous.
— A m ultitude of quantitative constraints. These constrain ts involve the re­
sources th a t a system  m ay use (com putation resources, power consum ption,
2m em ory usage, com m unication bandw idth, costs,..), assum ptions about the 
environm ent in which it operates (arrival rates, hybrid behavior), and re­
quirem ents on the services th a t the  system  has to  provide.
— High dependability  requirem ents. Besides functional constraints m any other 
aspects play a role in the design of em bedded system s: timeliness, fault to l­
erance, availability, security, safety, etc..
— Design and m anufacturing costs are very im portan t.
This com bination of factors makes the design of em bedded system s in general 
a very complex task. Failure of em bedded system s often m ay have serious con­
sequences (loss of lives, huge financial losses), so correctness and reliability are 
of vital im portance. As a result it is common for more th an  75% of em bedded 
software developm ent costs to  go into validation and verification. So there is a 
lot of poten tia l for saving money.
Validation and Verification There is quite some confusion in the  lite ra tu re  about 
the m eaning of the  term s validation and verification. I  prefer to  rem ain consistent 
w ith the trad itional usage of these term s [4,21]. Validation aims a t increasing 
confidence in the correct operation  of an im plem entation. Are we building the 
right system ? Ideally, the  desired behavior of a system  is fully specified in ad­
vance, bu t in practice it rarely occurs th a t we know exactly how a system  should 
behave under all possible circum stances. There exist two basic validation s tra te ­
gies, viz. the verification s tra tegy  and the falsification strategy. The objective of 
verification  is to  show th a t an im plem entation possesses a p roperty  prescribed 
by its specification. Are we building the system  right? An im plem entation is 
considered correct (or valid) if all properties prescribed by the  specification are 
present in the im plem entation. In  falsification  the  objective is to  try  and show 
th a t the negation of a specification requirem ent holds in an im plem entation. In 
this case an im plem entation is considered correct if all a ttem p ts  to  falsify a re­
quirem ent fail. Note th a t therefore in verification an im plem entation is rejected 
as a correct im plem entation if it does not posses a prescribed property, whereas 
in falsification an im plem entation is rejected when it does posses the negation of 
a prescribed property. Ideally, verification and falsification are com plem entary 
notions in the  sense th a t “falsification equals verification of the  negation” . How­
ever, in practice falsification is much weaker th an  verification (see e.g. Popper
[29]). B oth  verification and falsification can be used sim ultaneously for assessing 
the correctness of im plem entations.
Models provide (m athem atical) abstractions of a physical system  th a t allow en­
gineers to  reason about th a t system  by ignoring extraneous details while focusing 
on relevant ones. All forms of engineering rely on models to  understand  complex, 
real-world systems. M odels m ay be developed as a precursor to  im plem enting 
the physical system , or they  m ay be derived from an existing system  or a system  
in developm ent as an aid to  understanding its behavior. In the software engi­
neering world, m odeling has a rich trad ition , dating  back to  the  earliest days of 
program m ing. Boosted by the work of the O bject M anagem ent G roup (OM G) on
3the  Unified M odeling Language (UML) and Model Driven A rchitecture (MDA), 
the role of models during application design, im plem entation, verification and 
validation has become much more im portan t in recent years, and this is a very 
positive development. M odel-Driven Development (MDD) is a system  develop­
m ent technique in which the prim ary  artifact is a model, which is a collection 
of views. Ideally, the  technique allows engineers to  (graphically) model the re­
quirem ents, behavior and functionality  of com puter based systems. The model 
allows all the stakeholders to  partic ipa te  in the developm ent process. The de­
sign is iteratively  analyzed, validated, and tested  th roughout the development 
proces while autom atically  generated production quality  code can be o u tp u t in 
a variety of languages.
The promise of model driven developm ent is to  allow definition of machine 
readable application and d a ta  models which allow long-term  flexibility of:
— im plem entation: different/new  im plem entation infrastructure  can be inte­
grated  or ta rgeted  by existing designs.
— integration and component reuse: since not only the im plem entation bu t the 
design exists a t tim e of integration, we can au tom ate the production  of d a ta  
in tegration  bridges and the  connection to  new in tegration infrastructures. 
The availability of interface models of com ponents facilitates reuse.
— verification and validation: since the  developed models can be used to  gener­
ate code, they  can equally be validated against requirem ents, tested  against 
various infrastructures, and can used to  directly  sim ulate the behavior of 
the system  being designed. Formal verification  is the  process of m athem ati­
cally checking th a t the  behavior of a system  (com ponent), described using a 
formal model, satisfies a given property, also described using a formal model.
— maintenance: the availability of the  design in a m achine-readable form gives 
developers direct access to  the  specification of the  system , m aking m ainte­
nance much simpler
Depending on the role th a t models play in the design process, we see differ­
ent types of models. Ideally, there are well-defined relationships between these 
models. Models from which im plem entations can be generated are typically con­
structed  using commercial tools such as R ational Rose, R hapsody and visual- 
STATE, and usually contain a lot of details, including code fragm ents. Interface 
models focus on the external behavior of system s and com ponents. These models 
typically are much more abstract. A useful classification of com ponent specifica­
tions ( “contracts” ) has been proposed by B eugnard et al [3], where a hierarchy 
is defined consisting of four levels:
— Level 1: Syntactic interface, or signature (i.e. types, fields, m ethods, signals, 
ports, etc. th a t constitu te  the interface).
— Level 2: C onstraints on values of param eters and of persistent s ta te  variables, 
expressed e.g., by pre- and post-conditions and invariants.
— Level 3: Synchronization between different services and m ethod calls (e.g., 
expressed as constrain ts on their tem poral ordering via s ta te  machines or 
tem poral logic).
4— Level 4: E xtra-functional properties (in particu lar real-tim e a ttribu tes, per­
formance, QoS (i.e. constrain ts on response times, th roughput, etc..) This 
level can be separated  into two aspects 
4a tim ing properties ( e.g. absolute tim e bounds)
4b Q uality  of Service properties, typically given by perform ance measures, 
often form ulated in stochastic term s (e.g. average response tim e).
Currently, m ost com ponent modeling frameworks support only level 1 contracts, 
while some also support level 2 and 3 contracts (for instance, the  ISpec frame­
work studied  in PRO G RESS project EES.5141). For em bedded system s Level
4 properties are im portan t (their specification has been studied in PRO G RESS 
project TES.4999). Models for verification and validation, finally, typically focus 
on some specific aspects of a system s behavior. T hey are as abstrac t as possible 
in order to  make analysis tractable.
A serious practical question is how much effort to  p u t in building models. 
C onstructing good models is difficult and m ost software developers dislike w rit­
ing them . Aiming a t the  highest quality  models, e.g. by using formal specification 
techniques, is expensive and requires highly skilled developers. Spending m ini­
mal effort on constructing models can also be expensive except th a t the costs are 
incurred later in the  system s life cycle by increased m aintenance costs, custom er 
dissatisfaction, etc.. In practice the right balance between these two extrem es 
has to  be found. In finding the balance several issues have to  be taken into ac­
count such as the expected lifetime and usage of the models, the  skills of the 
readers and w riters of the  specifications, how critical the  interfaces are, etc. [24].
Sim ulation rem ains the m ain tool to  validate models, bu t the im portance of 
formal validation & verification is growing, especially for safety-critical em bed­
ded systems. A lthough still in its infancy, it shows more promise th a t verification 
of a rb itra ry  systems, such as generic software program s, because em bedded sys­
tem s are often specified in a restricted  way [16]. Sim ulation of em bedded system s 
is challenging because they  are heterogeneous. In particular, m ost contain soft­
ware and hardw are com ponents th a t m ust be sim ulated a t the  same tim e (this 
is the  co-sim ulation problem ). A lthough there is a lot to  say about sim ulation,
1 will focus in th is paper on formal verification, also because this has been the 
m ain research topic of research w ithin the PRO G RESS research projects th a t I 
have been asked to  discuss.
2 Form al M eth od s
M athem atics has always been of great im portance in engineering. The term  “for­
mal m ethods” is commonly used to  refer to  the applied m athem atics of com puter 
system  engineering. W hereas trad itional engineering disciplines rely heavily on 
continuous m athem atics (analysis, num erical com putation), the design of de­
pendable com puter based system s requires a more discrete style of m athem ati­
cal reasoning. These system s are typically modelled as discrete event dynam ical 
system s (sta te  machines, au tom ata) and the ir specification and analysis requires 
the use of m athem atical logic and advanced search algorithm s to  enable model
5checking and theorem  proving. B ut also quantita tive  approaches and continuous 
m athem atics are increasingly applied in formal m ethods, for instance in per­
formance analysis and design of hybrid systems. In th is paper, I will focus my 
atten tion  to  formal m ethods for validation and verification.
One only has to  open up any book on algorithm s to  see th a t m athem atics 
plays a key role in their verification and analysis. Nevertheless, m ost software 
engineering projects hold formal m ethods a t a rm ’s length unless they  involve 
critical system s [9, 31]. Is th is due m athfobia? Is it a m a tte r of lack of training? 
Or is application of formal m ethods sim ply not cost effective? In an a ttem p t to  
answer these questions, I will discuss a spectrum  of formal m ethods, ranging from 
from cheap and incom plete to  expensive and com plete (see Figure 1, adapted  
from Rushby).
Effort
F ig . 1. A spectrum  of formal methods.
Berry has suggested to  use the term  “autom atic bug detection” in place of 
“formal verification” to  underscore th a t it is too  much to  hope for a conclusive 
proof of any nontrivial design. Instead  the  goal of formal verification should be 
a technology th a t will help designers preventing problem s in deployed systems. 
The point is th a t in m ost cases a formal model is a ra ther aggressive abstraction  
of the real design th a t it intends to  capture, and sim ilarly a formal specification 
is typically ju s t an abstraction  of a fragm ent of the full set of requirem ents. 
Therefore, if we m anage to  formally verify th a t the  model satisfies its specifi­
cation we m ay usually not conclude th a t the system s m eets its requirem ents. 
However, a counterexam ple found during formal verification often leads to  the 
discovery of a flaw in the design. In fact, formal verification tu rn s  out to  be an
6extrem ely effective m ethod for finding bugs. The paradox is th a t the verification 
at the  level of the  formal model often am ounts to  falsification of the  real system! 
Given the fact th a t people often m ix up a model of a system  w ith the system  
itself, th is paradox has created an enorm ous am ount of confusion.
A basic idea in formal m ethods is to  use symbolic calculation. A single sym­
bolic calculation can subsum e m any individual num eric cases (just as x 2 — y2 =  
(x — y) x  (x +  y) subsum es 36 — 16 =  2 x 10, 49 — 4 =  5 x 9, etc.). By using 
symbolic calculation, formal m ethods tools can search huge s ta te  spaces (tril­
lions of reachable states) efficiently. As a result, these tools can be used to  find 
rare error scenarios as well as to  verify their absence. Symbolic calculation is 
mechanized using the m ethods of au tom ated  reasoning: theorem  proving, model 
checking, constrain t solving, etc.. There has been sustained progress in these 
fields for several decades and they  have recently broken though the  barriers to  
practical application.
2.1  T h eo rem  P rovers
As soon as bo th  a system  and its specification have been modelled as m athem ati­
cal entities, verification essentially am ounts to  proving a m athem atical theorem . 
Following the pioneering work of N.G. de B ruijn  on A u tom ath1, m any proof 
assistents have been developed: software tools in which m athem atical theories 
can be expressed and the correctness proofs of m athem atical theorem s can be 
checked m echanically and interactively, e.g. PVS, ACL2, HOL, Isabelle, Nuprl 
and Coq. Use of interactive theorem  proving requires great skill and resources 
bu t allows one to  solve very hard  problems.
The m ost prom inent commercial application of theorem  proving has been 
by Intel C orporation in the  area of hardw are verification. Intel wrote off 475 
million USD to  cover dam ages for the  incident w ith the incorrect division in 
early Pentium  Processors (also known as the FD IV  bug), which occurred in 
1994. A sim ilar problem  in current chip designs would be much more costly. 
Chip designs are getting  more complex, bu t the associated testing  problem  is 
growing even faster in size and complexity. T raditional testing  techniques are 
not sufficiently powerful and formal verification techniques can sometimes offer 
a solution. In fact, since the FD IV  bug formal verification has become almost 
standard  practice in the  hardw are industry. Tw enty percent of the Pentium  IV 
design was formally verified and m any high-quality bugs were discovered before 
“first silicon” . The HOL light theorem  prover was used by John H arrison and his 
team  to  verify the  floating point operations of the  Itan ium  processor. As was to  
be expected, several bugs were found in the design. The verification also increased 
the problem  understanding, which eventually led to  several im provem ents in the 
design [27].
W ith in  D utch universities there is extensive expertise on theorem  proving. 
The EU IST Verificard project, th a t was coordinated by the University of Nij­
megen, built a verification tool called LO O P on top of the theorem  prover PVS
1 See h t tp : / /a u to m a th .w e b h o p .n e t / .
7to  verify software for Java C ard  sm artcards. The European sm artcard  industry  
needs th is type of technology to  ob tain  security certifications at the  highest 
levels of the Common C riteria  standard , an in ternational s tandard  (ISO 15408) 
for com puter security  evaluations. The project team  found a coding error in 
a critical sm artcard  application, enabling continued tru s t and reliability in the 
application in question.
W ith in  PRO G RESS project CES.5009, the  PVS theorem  prover has been 
used to  study  transparen t replication of Splice com ponents. A problem  with 
tim e stam ps prevented full transparency  of replication. A solution was proposed 
by the project (involving the copying of tim e stam ps in certain  situations) and 
adopted in a newer version of Splice.
Despite these success stories it is fair to  say th a t a t the  m om ent direct applica­
tion of interactive theorem  proving tools is not cost-effective for D utch industry, 
except possibly for a few small niche areas.2:
One of these niche areas m ight be the high-level description and analysis of 
architectures. The higher-order logic languages used by general purpose in terac­
tive theorem  provers are extrem ely expressive and allow for concise description 
of all the  concepts th a t play a role w ithin an architecture (the inpu t languages 
for o ther verification tools are typically much less expressive). Typically, the 
num ber of concepts involved is not too  big, and the central role of an architec­
tu re  in a design justifies a serious investem ent in (formal) validation en verifi­
cation. W ith in  PRO G RESS case studies in th is direction have been carried out 
by project CES.5009 (Splice) and project TES.4999 (the E th e re a l network on 
chip [19]). Theorem  provers are also an im portan t area for academic researchers. 
They are widely used for verification of complex d istribu ted  and real-tim e al­
gorithm s, and on the long run  they  will revolutionize the way m athem aticians 
work. A recent breakthrough was obtained by Benjam in W erner (INRIA) and 
Georges G onthier (Microsoft Research), who succeeded in 2004 to  use the Coq 
proof assistent to  create a surveyable proof of the  celebrated four color theorem .
2.2  M o d e l C h eck in g
Model checking is emerging as a practical tool for au tom ated  debugging of com­
plex reactive system s such as em bedded controllers and network protocols. In 
model checking, specifications about the  system  are expressed as (tem poral) logic 
formulas, and efficient symbolic algorithm s are used to  traverse the model de­
fined by the system  and check if the  specification holds or not. E xtrem ely large 
state-spaces can often be traversed in m inutes. Model checkers were initially  de­
veloped to  reason about the logical correctness of discrete s ta te  system s (SMV, 
CADP, SPIN,yU,CRL,SAL), bu t have since been extended to  deal w ith real-tim e 
( U p p a a l ) ,  probabilistic system s (PRISM ) and lim ited forms of hybrid system s 
(Hytech, PHAVER).
2 The basic algorithmic techniques and decision procedures used w ithin theorem  
provers (resolution, BDDs, SAT solving,..) are applied successfully in many of the 
invisible formal methods, to  be discussed in Section 2.4.
8The two greatest advantages of model checking over theorem  proving are (1) 
once a model and a property  are specified, analysis is in principle fully autom atic; 
(2) the ability  to  produce counterexam ples th a t can be used in testing, debug­
ging or o ther analysis. D isadvantages result from the tradeoffs m ade to  make 
autom ation possible: in particu lar the expressivity of the modelling and specifi­
cation languages is lim ited. Model checking tools face a com binatorial blow up 
of the state-space, commonly known as the state explosion problem, th a t m ust 
be addressed to  solve m ost real-world problems.
Building verification models for realistic applications th a t are b o th  interesting 
and trac tab le  does require significant expertise and tim e, and as a result model 
checking often is not push-botton  technology. Nevertheless, for a large class 
of problem s model checkers are extrem ely easy to  use. W hen a group of high 
school students (age 15-16) visited our university a few years ago to  learn about 
C om puter Science, I asked them  to  analyze and correct a flawed design of a 
controller for a simple railroad crossing using U p p a a l .  W ithou t any train ing  
they  discovered how to  tackle the  problem  using the tool and a t the end of the 
session some girls even asked where they  could download th is “cool” software 
package to  continue playing w ith it a t home. In a first-year m andatory  course on 
O perating Systems th is semester, after ju s t one hour of training, CS students had 
no problem  to  use a model checker to  validate their solution to  the  concurrency 
problem  of Figure 2.3 Among my students I did not observe any m athfobia
Travellers come to  a taxi stop and wait for a taxi. W hen the taxi arrives, 
all the waiting travellers invoke boardTaxi, bu t anyone who arrives while 
the taxi is boarding has to  wait for the next taxi. The capacity of the taxi 
is 4 people; if there are more than  4 people waiting, some will have to 
wait for the next taxi. W hen all the waiting travellers have boarded, the 
taxi can invoke d ep a rt. If the taxi arrives when there are no travellers, 
it should depart immediately.
The problem is to  write synchronization code th a t enforces all of these 
constraints using semaphores, and to  model and validate the correctness 
of your solution w ith the U p p a a l model checker.
F ig . 2. A simple concurrency problem.
or dislike of formal m ethods. They ju s t appreciated th a t the tool helped them  
to  solve their problem. O f course, applying model checking techniques on real 
industrial problem s is som ewhat more involved.
There have been num erous successful applications of model checking technol­
ogy to  industrial problem s (see e.g. [13, 25, 27] for pointers). In term s of im pact, 
the m ain application area is again validation of hardw are circuits by com pa­
nies such as Intel. B u t also in the field of network and com m unication pro­
tocols model checking has become an indispensible tool. Model checking has
3 Models of semaphores were made available.
9been applied successfully to  all kinds of scheduling problem s in m anufactur­
ing, tran sp o rta tio n  and real-tim e scheduling. Section 2.3 will describe some 
recent successes in model checking software. W ith in  PRO G RESS, the projects 
CES.5008, CES.5009, and TES.4999 have applied and further developed model 
checking technology. Below I report on some model checking case studies th a t 
were carried out by these projects.
One of the m ain applications studied  by project CES.5008 was a system  for 
lifting trucks (lorries, railway carriages, buses and other vehicles). This system  
consists of a num ber of lifts; each lift supports one wheel of the truck th a t is 
being lifted and has its own m icrocontroller. The controls of the different lifts 
are connected by m eans of a cyclic network. A special purpose protocol has been 
developed to  let the lifts operate synchronously. W hen testing  the im plem enta­
tion, the developers found three problems. They solved these problem s by tria l 
and error, p a rtly  because the causes of two of the three problem s were unclear. 
In close collaboration w ith the developers a t A dd-Controls, the CES.5008 re­
searchers modeled and analyzed the system  in yU,CRL model checker [20]. The 
three known problem s showed up in the model and in addition a fourth error 
was found. Solutions for all four problem s were proposed and it was shown th a t, 
after incorporating these solutions, the model m et all the  requirem ents of the 
developers. The overall conclusion was th a t the  yU,CRL model was an efficient 
tool to  understand  the  behavior of th is application. The case study  also revealed 
lim itations of the toolset and worked as a catalyst to  have its capacities enlarged.
One of the  case studies carried out by PRO G RESS project TES.4999 (HaaST) 
was in itia ted  by the home networking group of Philips Research. The study  
concerned the Zeroconf protocol4, an IE T F  stan d ard  dedicated to  the self­
configuration of IPv4 network interfaces. The task  was to  investigate the  trade-off 
between reliability and effectiveness of th is protocol. The problem  was tackled 
from different directions. The group in Twente analyzed a simple stochastic cost 
model of the protocol, where reliability is m easured in term s of the probability  
to  avoid an address collision after configuration, while effectiveness is viewed as 
the average penalty  perceived by a user. The solution m ethod was optim isation 
of several protocol param eters on m inim al cost [5,6]. The group in Nijmegen 
developed a U p p a a l  model of the  protocol in order to  analyze functional cor­
rectness and real-tim e behavior [18]. The conclusion was th a t U p p a a l ,  which 
combines extended finite sta te  machines, C-like syntax and concepts from tim ed 
au tom ata  theory, is able to  model Zeroconf in a faithful and intuitive way, using 
notations th a t are familiar to  protocol engineers. The m odeling efforts revealed 
several errors (or a t least ambiguities) in the In ternet standard  th a t no one else 
spo tted  before. Also a num ber of points were identified where U p p a a l  still can 
be improved. After applying a num ber of (m anual) abstractions, U p p a a l  was 
able to  fully explore the  sta te  space of an instance of the model w ith three hosts, 
and to  establish some correctness properties.
A nother case study  carried out by project TES499, also proposed by Philips 
Research, concerned a d istribu ted  algorithm  to  m onitor the availability of nodes
4 See w w w .zeroconf.org.
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in self-configuring networks. The simple scheme to  regularly probe a node — 
“are you still there?” — m ay easily lead to  over- or underloading. The essence of 
the algorithm  is therefore to  autom atically  adap t the  probing frequency. I t was 
shown th a t a self-adaptive scheme to  control the  probe load, originally proposed 
as an extension to  the  U P nP T M  (Universal P lug and Play) s tandard , leads to  an 
unfair trea tm en t of nodes: some nodes probe fast while others alm ost starve. A 
very simple, alternative d istribu ted  algorithm  was proposed th a t overcomes this 
problem  and th a t to lerates highly dynam ic network topology changes [7]. The 
analysis results have been obtained using the  M O D EST/M O B IU S tool suite. 
M ODEST is a modeling language w ith a formal sem antics [15] th a t has been 
developed w ithin the project. The form ality of the  language allows not only for 
the in tegration  w ith o ther formal analysis tools (such as model checkers), but, 
more im portantly, is essential to  carry  out sem antically sound sim ulation runs 
w ith MOBIUS. This results in a trustw orthy  analysis chain (one th a t can be 
validated by m eans of the  sem antics). S tandard  sim ulation environm ents are 
risky to  use instead, because they  have been found to  exhibit contradictory  
results (bo th  quantita tively  and qualitatively, i.e. difference in behavior) even in 
simple case studies [12].
Model checking is applied very successfully and on a regular basis by verifica­
tion experts in several niche areas. In m any cases there can be no doubt th a t the 
technology is cost-effective. Nevertheless, much more effort is required before 
model checking will become m ain stream  technology. The following problem s 
need to  be addressed:
1. Scalability. Model checkers m ust cope w ith the  s ta te  space explosion problem. 
This grow th often renders the  mechanical verification of realistic models 
practically  impossible: there ju s t is not enough tim e or m em ory available. 
In order to  make the models tractab le , abstraction  is required, bu t finding 
these abstractions can be a tim e consum ing effort th a t requires expertise.
2. Accessibility. Building a good model is difficult because model checkers are 
m ostly academic tools th a t lack extensive docum entation  and require a th o r­
ough knowledge of the  underlying principles to  build models th a t are suitable 
for analysis.5 Thus, in practice, model checking tools are inaccessible to  peo­
ple w ith little or no background in formal verification.
3. Relation between model and system. The relationships between an (abstract) 
model of a system  and the system  itself is typically som ewhat obscure. One 
can verify a high-level design, bu t w hat does th a t say about the  realization 
of th a t design? As pointed out by Brinksm a and M ader [10], current re­
search seems to  take the construction of verification models more or less for 
granted, although their developm ent typically requires a coordinated inte­
gration  of the experience, in tu ition  and creativ ity  of verification and dom ain 
experts. There is a great need for system atic m ethods for the  construction of 
verification models to  move on, and leave the current stage th a t can be char­
acterized as th a t of “model hacking” . The ad-hoc construction of verification
5 This does not apply to  some specialized in-house industrial tools th a t incorporate 
model checking techniques.
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models obscures the  relationship between models and the  system s th a t they  
represent, and underm ines the  reliability and relevance of the verification 
results th a t are obtained.
4. Convenience. Model checkers usually are not a p a rt of the developm ent tool- 
chain w ith the  result th a t there is little  or no autom ation. Furtherm ore, 
m any current tools and their input formalisms lack im portan t features for 
convenient specifications in an industrial setting. As a result, m odeling and 
analysis require a significant am ount of time.
Much research is going on to  extend the  technology in these directions.
2.3  A u to m a te d  A b str a c tio n
As explained in the previous subsection, a key problem  for model checking is 
scalability. Even though model checking technology has become very powerful, 
it is for instance typically not possible to  fully explore UML models th a t are 
intended for code generation: when you try  to  do it these models ju s t explode 
in your hands.6 To check large systems, abstraction  is therefore a key paradigm : 
the purpose of an abstrac t model is to  re ta in  those features of a system  th a t are 
necessary to  verify the desired property, and to  om it all unnecessary detail.
For verification of hardw are and m anually constructed  models of em bedded 
systems, m any generic abstractions (e.g. sym m etries, d a ta -pa th , abstrac t in ter­
pretation) have been proven useful. W ith in  PRO G RESS projects CES.5009 and 
TES.4999 powerful abstraction  techniques have been added to  the  model check­
ing tools yU,CRL and U p p a a l ,  abstrac t in terp re ta tion  and sym m etry  reduction, 
respectively, thereby greatly  enhancing their applicability.
An even more am bitious approach has been followed by the SAL (Symbolic 
Analysis Laboratory) project at SRI [2]. SAL is a framework for combining 
different tools to  calculate properties of concurren t/reactive systems. The heart 
of SAL is a language for specifying concurrent system s in a com positional way. 
The current im plem entation of the  SAL framework augm ents PVS w ith tools 
for abstraction, invariant generation, program  analysis (such as slicing), theorem  
proving, and model checking to  separate concerns as well as calculate properties 
(i.e. perform  symbolic analysis) of concurrent systems. Altough it is still in the 
pro to type stage and its usefulness for tackling industrial problem s needs to  be 
dem onstrated , SAL can be viewed as a prom issing a ttem p t to  bridge the gap 
between model checking and theorem  proving.
Recently a num ber of breakthroughs have been achieved and we see, for in­
stance, th a t model-checking techniques are now being applied to  validation of 
source-code (in particu lar C and JAVA) — so-called software validation  or run­
tim e verification. Noticeable successes in th is area have been obtained by the 
SLAM and B last projects and tools. A basic technique used by these tools is 
abstraction-refinement. In abstraction  refinement an initial very course abstrac­
tion of a program  is com puted autom atically. In this abstraction , for instance,
6 This visual description is due to  Koos Rooda.
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the  only inform ation about an integer variable th a t is preserved is w hether it 
is zero, positive or negative. Or, alternatively, all valuations of program  vari­
ables th a t cannot be distinguished by any of the Boolean guards th a t occur in 
the program  are deemed equivalent. Next exhaustive sta te  space search (model 
checking) is used to  explore the  abstrac t model. If in the  abstrac t model no 
“bad” s ta te  can be reached then  we know by construction th a t no bad  sta te  can 
be reached by the original program . In this case we have established correctness 
of the program , and we are done. In case a bad  s ta te  can be reached in the 
abstrac t model then  there are two possibilities:
1. either there is a corresponding execution of the  original program  th a t leads 
to  a bad  state; this means th a t we have found a bug in the original program ,
2. or the  bad  execution in the  abstrac t model does not correspond to  any 
execution in the original program ; in th is case we can use the inform ation 
about the  failed correspondence to  construct a refinement of the abstraction, 
th a t is, a new abstraction  th a t is in between the old abstraction  and the 
program , and we repeat the analysis.
SLAM and B last have been succesfully applied w ithin the dom ain of debugging 
of device drivers (program s w ith over 100,000 lines of C code). In his keynote 
address at W inHec 2002, Bill G ates referred to  the  SLAM project as follows:
“Things like even software verification, this has been the Holy Grail of 
computer science fo r  m any decades but now in  some very key areas, fo r  
example, driver verification w e ’re building tools that can do actual proof 
about the software and how it works in  order to guarantee the reliability. ”
I expect eventually it will be possible to  apply software model checking also 
to  the  analysis of em bedded software and to  UML like models. Still, scalability 
rem ains a key issue and in order to  enable routine use of formal verification 
techniques in the  em bedded system s area much further research is needed.
2.4  In v is ib le  F orm al M e th o d s
Even though m anual construction of abstrac t verification models can be very re­
warding and helps to  obtain  insight and improve a design, practitioners of course 
prefer to  have push-bo tton  verification technology th a t can be applied directly  
to  their UML models and software. The concept of types and the  development 
of au tom atic algorithm s for establishing type correctness is one of the big suc­
cesses of formal m ethods research. The algorithm s and their underlying m ath  are 
com pletely invisible to  the  user, bu t still the  re tu rn  on investm ent is excellent. 
M odel-based developm ent provides the  artifacts needed by au tom ated  analy­
sis, and th is creates some exciting new opportunities for applying m athem ati­
cal analysis techniques. Commercial tools such as R ational Rose (Real-Time), 
R hapsody and visualSTATE support verification of certain  functional correct­
ness properties (e.g. absence of deadlock). H idden from the engineer sometimes 
very sophisticated formal m ethods are being used to  provide these results. For
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these invisible formal m ethods, convenience is more im portan t th an  generality. 
They will not find all the bugs in your design bu t they  will find m ost of them  
fast and autom atically.
Form al V er ifica tio n  A nice example of invisible formal m ethods is provided 
by visualSTATE, a suite of graphical tools for design of em bedded system s and 
event-driven system s developed by IA R Systems. The tool uses a sophisticated 
verification algorithm  called com positional backward reachability analysis to  
exhaustively verify large industrial applications— com prising more th an  1,000 
com ponents— in a few m inutes on a stan d ard  PC [34]. This (patented) technique 
allows designers to  test th a t their s ta te  machine design model and em bedded ap­
plication does not contain any of the following problem atic properties:
— s ta te , local and system  wide deadlock conditions,
— conflicting transitions between states,
— unreachable states, i.e. sta tes th a t cannot be entered by any sequence of 
events from the environm ent,
— unused events or signals, i.e. stim uli to  the  system  th a t is not acted upon,
— unused transitions, i. e. transitions th a t will never fire, regardless of the event 
sequence fed into the  system,
— unused actions or assignments,
— unused variables, param eters and constants.
In the  realms of software, analysis tools such as the Extended S tatic  Checker 
for Java (E SC /Java, [17]), tu rn  out to  be very effective. E S C /Jav a  is a program ­
ming tool th a t a ttem p ts  to  find common run-tim e errors in JM L -annotated  Java 
program s (i.e. Level 2 interface specs according to  the  classification of B eugnard 
et al [3]) by sta tic  analysis of the  program  code and its formal annotations. 
Users can control the am ount and kinds of checking th a t E S C /Jav a  perform s by 
annotating  the ir program s w ith specially form atted  com m ents called pragm as. 
Because E S C /Java  abstrac ts from the full Java sem antics it will not spot all 
the  program  bugs th a t analysis w ith a theorem  prover such as the LO O P tool 
will reveal. B ut because it is autom atic, E S C /Java  is in m ost cases much more 
effective.
Still the  type of properties th a t can be verified using invisible formal m ethods 
is restricted. From  the point of view of em bedded system s, MDD tools have a 
serious lack of support for predicting real-tim e behaviour, resource-consum ption 
and perform ance in general of the generated code (Level 4 properties). Clearly, 
much more research is needed in th is direction. Given the effectiveness of invisible 
verification techniques (see also Figure 1), I consider th is to  be an im portan t 
research direction.
C o rrectn ess  o f  Im p lem en ta tio n s  Bridging the gap between high-level m od­
elling or program m ing abstractions, and im plem entation platform s is one of the 
key challenges for em bedded software research [33,26]. Tools such as R ational
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Rose (Real-Tim e), R hapsody and visualSTATE allow us to  generate code di­
rectly  from models, bu t how do we know th a t th is code is actually  correct? 
In particular, how do we know th a t the  generated code m eets hard  real-tim e 
constraints?
An im portan t step  towards supporting quantita tive analysis of real-tim e as­
pects is provided by the modelling formalism of tim ed au tom ata . Since their 
introduction by Alur and Dill [1] in 1990, several verification tools for tim ed au­
to m ata  have been developed, which are now applied routinely to  industrial-size 
case studies. However, as yet, there is no support for generation of predictable 
code from tim ed au tom ata  models. In fact, th is is a nontrivial research problem  
due to  the a rb itra ry  precision of clocks in tim ed au tom ata.
The problem  of providing a predictable design trajectory has been discussed 
at length by Henk Corporaal in his w hite paper [14] and his group has made 
some im portan t first steps tow ards a solution [22]. Fully solving th is problem  
will require extensive use of formal m ethods, which in the end will be invisible 
to  the  designer.
T estin g  Model Based Testing (M BT) aims a t the autom atic creation, execution 
and evaluation of test cases to  test software systems. In m ost software projects 
testing  is done by hand. There are some tools th a t au tom ate  p arts  of the test pro­
cess, like test execution an d /o r test evaluation. The goal of M BT is to  autom ate 
the entire test process. The claimed benefits are:
— B e tte r coverage of functionality. M BT can create and execute more and 
b e tte r test cases th an  hum ans can. M BT is very thorough, in principal it 
can cover the entire functionality of the  system . It can for instance generate 
test vectors th a t will drive an im plem entation through all the sta tes and 
transitions of its model.
— Faster testing. Everything is au tom ated  and as a result we can test faster. 
This is especially im portan t in the  test execution fase, as th is fase is close 
to  the  delivery deadline and is under a lot of tim e pressure.
— C heaper testing. M BT enables more thorough testing  w ith less people (in 
less time)
M BT uses a model of the  system  th a t is under test (so called SUT: System 
Under Test). The model describes (part of) the behavior of the  SUT (functional 
an d /o r extra-functional behavior, like tim ing, perform ance, etc.).
For testing  of control-dominated systems (i.e. system s w ith a high degree of 
in teraction w ith their environm ents) there is a rich and w ell-understood theory  
of m odel-based testing  (part of which was developed w ithin the PRO G RESS 
project TES.5417), which has been (partially) im plem ented in a num ber of 
m odel-based testing  tools such as:
— The Reactis Simulink Tester generates test suites autom atically  from Simulink 
or Stateflow diagram s. Each test consists of a sequence of stim ulus/response 
pairs, where each stim ulus assigns an inpu t value to  each in-port in the model
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and each response records an ou tp u t value for each ou t-port. The test suites 
are generated from a coverage criteria  of the  specification, e.g., transition  or 
sta te  coverage.
— The Conform iq Test G enerator autom atically  generates test cases from UML 
sta te  chart models. Sim ulations of the  models can be used to  generate batches 
of test cases th a t can later be executed. Alternatively, the models can be 
in terpreted  dynam ically to  facilitate on-the-fly testing.
— Similarly, the S tatem ate MAGNUM ATG (I-Logix) tool uses model-checking 
and sim ulation techniques to  derive test sequences from s ta te  chart models.
— RT-Tester (Bremen) and TorX (University of Twente) are bo th  tools w ith 
an underlying formal theory  and are rooted in academia. B oth  tools are for 
on-the-fly test generation and execution, where the specification is contin­
ually probed for relevant inpu t stim uli and used to  check the  validity of 
ou tp u t actions. R T-tester accepts specifications in a m ixture of languages, 
bu t m ainly tim ed CSP, whereas TorX accepts Prom ela or LOTOS.
— T G V  (Irisa) and Telelogic TestCom poser are SDL based test case generators. 
Given an SDL specification and a test purpose (or a specification coverage 
criterion) these tools construct a test case th a t m eets the  test purpose, and 
stores this in TT C N  form at. P hac t (Philips Research) TestGen (INT, France) 
also produce TTC N  test suites, bu t uses FSM  checking experim ent based test 
generation.
Tools like TorX and TG V  allow for the  on-line and off-line generation of sound 
and com plete test suites from discrete, sta te-based  models, such as Labeled Tran­
sition Systems, and they  can use test purposes to  steer the test derivation algo­
rithm s to  explore behaviours of the  SUT th a t are more likely to  contain large 
am ounts of bugs. For m any systems, however, such simple state-based models 
are not sufficient. They require richer models, which include quan tita tive  infor­
m ation, such as real-tim e, continuous or complex d a ta  variables, and stochastic 
properties (e.g. perform ance, statistics, probabilities). A lthough some early pro­
to type tools exist th a t combine control w ith tim e, da ta , or stochastics, e.g. STG, 
TTG , UPPAAL Tron, and an extension of TorX, the  theory  regarding model- 
based testing  for quantita tive  models is still in its infancy.
Although there can be no doubt th a t M BT is a very im portan t and interesting 
technique, which eventually will find its way into all m ajor MDD tools, the 
cost-effectiveness of current M BT techniques is not evident. Different authors 
arrive a t different conclusions. Cam pbell et al [11] report enthousiastically on a 
M BT tool Spec Explorer, which is being used daily by several Microsoft product 
groups. In one particu lar setting, their m odel-based approach helped to  discover 
10 tim es more errors th an  trad itional test autom ation and the kind of bugs 
discovered were deep system-level bugs ( i.e. bugs th a t were only found after the 
system  perform ed m any steps), for which m anual test cases would have been 
hard  to  construct. This story  is in sharp  contrast w ith a report by Pretchner
[30] (presented a t the  very same m eeting), who took a critical look a t M BT and 
concludes th a t, to  the  best of his knowledge, there is no published evidence th a t 
the promises of M BT are kept. A lthough the  study  by P retchner is too  small
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to  make generic conclusions, it is clear from his experim ents th a t the benefits of 
M BT should not be taken for granted. A lot of further research will be required 
on M BT to  tu rn  it into a m atu re  technology. A challenging question, for instance, 
is to  find good m easures for coverage.
U sin g  M o d els  for D ia g n o sis  and  C o n tro l As hum an beings we m aintain 
num erous models about ourselves and the world we live in. We use these models 
to  in terp re t our observations of reality, to  analyse causes when som ething goes 
wrong, to  predict the  future, and to  device strategies for well-being and survival. 
In th is light it is very n a tu ra l th a t the models of com puter based system s th a t we 
construct w ith MDD tools are not only used to  generate software and to  predict 
the fu ture (which is essentially w hat verification and validation is about) bu t also 
for in terpreting  observations of im plem entations and as a basis for controlling 
physical systems.
W ith in  control theory, model predictive control (also called model based 
control) is an industry  proven solution to  complex process control problems th a t 
s ta rted  out in the  late 1970s in the refining and petrochem ical industries. At the 
heart of M PC is a m athem atical model of the  process th a t is used to  predict 
future process behaviour. Using th is predictive model the controller is able to  
calculate an optim um  set of process ac tuato r moves which minimise the error 
between actual and desired process behaviour subject to  ac tuato r and process 
constraints.
PRO G RESS project DES.7015 uses a m odel-based approach for fault diag­
nosis. If a system  does not behave according to  its specification, w hat is the  root 
cause of this failure, and w hat can we do about it?  Solving this problem  requires 
sophisticated probabilistic reasoning.
3 PR O G R E SS P rojects  on V erification and V alidation
In the previous section, several results obtained by PRO G RESS projects have 
already been described. In th is section, I will briefly sum m arize the  goals, results 
and utilisation for each of the  six PRO G RESS projects in the verification and 
validation area. For more inform ation I refer to  the  project websites, which are 
accessible via h t tp : / /w w w .s tw .n l/p ro g ra m m a s /p ro g re s s / .
3.1  C E S .5009: R e a l-t im e  D is tr ib u te d  S h ared  D a ta  S p ace
Goals The m ain goal of this project was to  evaluate the  applicability of the 
yU,CRL language and tools on some large-scale industrial applications, and to  
improve th is verification technology where needed. More specifically, the  goals of 
the project were (1) to  develop shared d a ta  space architectures, (2) to  formally 
model such architectures, (3) to  verify software applications based upon such 
architectures, and (4) to  develop the verification technology needed to  scale to  
shared dataspace applications.
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Results The following results were obtained:
1. A model for describing system s based on heterogeneous shared dataspace 
paradigm s. Special instances of the generic model are (the essential core of) 
Splice (Thales), 4TEC (4TEC), JavaSpaces (SUN M icrosystems). A m ethod­
ology has been developed and im plem ented to  autom atically  ob tain  dis­
trib u ted  pro to type im plem entations from such models. Also, a m ethodology 
has been developed and im plem ented to  autom atically  verify the models.
2. A formal model of the JavaSpace architecture. This model includes all rele­
vant features: reading/w riting , transactions, notification, leasing, and tim e­
outs. As a result, JavaSpace program  models can now be autom atically  ver­
ified by a model checker.
3. A line of tools for d istribu ted  model checking. This allows us to  scale veri­
fication m ethodology by using clusters of PCs. These tools are now p art of 
the m uCRL tool set.
4. Tools for applying abstrac t in terpreta tion . Given a default or user-specified 
abstraction , the  tool autom atically  generates a sm aller s ta te  space. The ab­
straction  tools have been im plem ented and in tegrated  in the  m uCRL toolset.
Utilisation The analysis of shared d a ta  space architectures revealed problems, 
provided solutions, and brought a lot of m ethodology and background knowledge 
to  b o th  companies involved in the project. The solutions provided by the CW I 
researchers found their way in subsequent versions of Splice and 4TEC. B oth 
tools th a t were developed have been applied in m any other projects, including 
PRO G RESS project CES.5008.
3.2  T E S .4999: H aaST : V erifica tion  o f  H ard  an d  S o ftly  T im ed  
S y stem s
Goals The H aaST project aim ed a t the developm ent and in tegration of m ethods 
and tools for the verification and analysis of real-tim e em bedded system s, w ith 
an em phasis on d istribu ted  algorithm s and protocols for consumer electronics 
applications. The goal was not only to  consider “hard” real-tim e constrain ts -  
those th a t require th a t a system  m ust react in tim e -  bu t also so-called “soft” 
real-tim e constrain ts -  those th a t require th a t the  system  should react in tim e 
bu t occasionally m ay not.
Results W ith in  H aaST a pro to type tool M O TO R  has been developed for model 
checking stochastic systems. The project also contributed  to  the further devel­
opm ent of the tim ed model checker U p p a a l ,  a tool th a t is now being used by 
thousand  of researchers b o th  in academ ia and industry. Verification of hard  and 
softly tim ed system s is considered as a m ost im portan t topic by the in ternational 
research community, w ith great societal relevance, and m any strong groups are 
working on it. I t is evident th a t during the lifetime of the project enormous 
progress has been m ade in th is area, w ith H aaST active on the front line. W ith  
contributions from the H aaST project, the  model checker U p p a a l  has advanced
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from an academic proof of concept to  a tool th a t is being downloaded by thou­
sands of researchers b o th  in academ ia and in industry, and th a t is now ready 
for further industrial development. The M O TO R  tool, which is a tru e  product 
of the H aaST project, is still very much in the stage of an academic prototype, 
bu t its poten tia l usefulness has been dem onstrated  already on some industrial 
case studies, and clearly further developm ent of th is tool will be m ost promising. 
Altogether, the  results of the H aaST project and the case studies th a t were car­
ried out indicate th a t in m any cases it can be advantageous (and cost effective!) 
to  perform  formal modelling and analysis of (tim ing related  or other) properties 
of em bedded system s using these m ethods. The precise modeling of the system  
under consideration often already gives an im portan t benefit, and, the  combined 
assessment of b o th  quan tita tive  and qualitative system  requirem ents using the 
same system  model can be of great value.
Utilisation The results of the  H aaST project are being used in several European 
research consortia on em bedded system s w ith strong industrial participation, 
no tab ly  the  IST-project Advanced methods fo r  timed system s (A M E T IS T )  and 
the network of excellence ARTIST. Also at the  national level there are cur­
rently  several research projects th a t are strongly related  to  H aaST and th a t are 
(partially) based on its results. The model checker U p p a a l  is by thousands of 
researchers bo th  in academ ia and in industry. See h ttp ://w w w .u p p a a l.c o m / for 
an incom plete listing of industrial application.
3.3  C E S .5008: Im p ro v in g  th e  Q u a lity  o f  E m b ed d ed  S y ste m s U sin g  
F orm al D e s ig n  T ech n iq u es
Goal To formally model and analyze some em bedded system s th a t were under 
developm ent by the com pany Add-Controls.
Results Besides the succesful modeling and analysis of the system  for lifting 
trucks th a t was described in the  previous section, also em bedded controllers for 
a staircase elevator and a hydrolic cylinder have been analyzed. Also a cache 
coherence protocol th a t was designed by the parallel system s group a t the Free 
University has been analyzed, and again a flaw in the design was found [28]. 
Q uite a num ber of o ther “academ ic” algorithm s and protocols were successfully 
analyzed using a wide variety of tools: yuCRL, CADP, PVS, U p p a a l  and PRISM .
Utilisation After com pletion of the  project, Add-Controls rem ained in terested  in 
the use of model checking technology for analyzing its designs. Under supervision 
of W an Fokkink and Ju n  Pang, an MsC studen t from the  R adboud University 
Nijmegen analyzed a redesign from the  lift system  using U p p a a l .
3.4  E E S .5141: S p ec ifica tio n  T o o lin g  for E m b ed d ed  S oftw are  
C o m p o n en ts
Goals Com ponent technologies such as DCOM, CORBA and Java Beans are 
being used in an increasing num ber of industrial em bedded systems. In com­
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ponent technology, interfaces play a key role; one com ponent can have more 
interfaces. C om ponents deliver and use services th rough explicit interfaces only. 
Proper interface specifications are a prerequisite in assuring the in teroperability  
of com ponents w ithin a system . The goal of th is project was to  take a m ain­
stream  extensible CASE tool supporting  UM L-based object-oriented modelling 
techniques (e.g. Rational Rose), and customize it in such a way th a t it pro­
vides optim al support for developing and deploying interface specifications for 
em bedded software com ponents. The custom ization relied on the  ISpec interface 
specification m ethodology developed and used a t Philips [23]. The formal un­
derpinning of th is tem plate-based methodology, involving sem antics for UML, 
ISpec and plug-in com ponent decriptions for ISpec tem plates, was one of the 
challenges of th is project.
Results A sem antics and a tool have been developed [32]. The la test version of the 
tool, which has been nam ed Calisto, is available a t w w w .w in .tu e .n l /c a l is to . 
The Arkas Software Engineering S tudent W orking G roup has been involved in 
the further developm ent of the tool: it has been converted to  the .NET frame­
work, suitable for use w ith Visio2003, and well docum ented.
Utilisation The tool is being used a t the  LaQuSo and w ithin ISpec courses 
w ithin Philips. The results and ideas generated by the project have also been 
used w ithin ITEA-DESS and ITEA -EM PR ESS. Possible applications at Philips 
Semiconductors, Philips Medical and Oce are being explored. There are also 
contacts w ith ASML.
3.5  T E S .5417: A to m y ste : A to m  S p litt in g  in  E m b ed d ed  S y stem s  
T estin g
Goal The goal of A tom yste has been to  enable changes in the  model and in test 
cases. Atom yste focusses on specific type of changes, nam ely “action refinem ent” . 
Action refinem ent m eans th a t we take an (incorrect) action in the model and 
replace it w ith correct or b e tte r behavior. For example, suppose our model tells us 
th a t we can enter a one euro coin in the  SUT and we find out th a t the  machine 
also accepts two fifty cent coins. Action refinement enables us to  replace the 
“one euro” behavior w ith behavior th a t also allows two fifty euro cent coins. As 
a result we can change the model and then  (autom atically) make new test cases 
th a t reflect the change, or we can directly  change already existing test cases.
Results A tom yste extended the M BT theory  to  enable action refinem ent in M BT 
and im plem ented the new theory  in a pro to type test tool. The effort th a t it takes 
to  create and m aintain  a model is im portan t for the  succes of M BT. Hence the 
results of Atom yste are im portan t for MBT.
Utilisation M ainly th rough the ESI project TANGRAM , which has ASML as 
carrying industrial partner.
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3.6  D E S .7015: F IN E S S E : F au lt D ia g n o sis  for E m b ed d ed  S y stem s  
D e p e n d a b ility
Goals The ability to  accurately diagnose and recover from faults in complex 
system s such as the  copiers of Oce constitu tes a crucial element in achieving 
higher system  dependability. As effective recovery (or repair) fully depends on 
the accuracy of the fault diagnostic process to  determ ine the root cause of failure, 
fault diagnosis (FD) is the  key determ ining factor. A part from the  operational 
phase, FD is also beneficial in the developm ent phase where m any system  faults 
occur as a result of im proper design an d /o r integration.
The FIN ESSE project develops and investigates an improved FD strategy, 
based on a novel FD m ethod w ithin a m odel-based approach. The m ethod pro­
vides the required diagnostic accuracy to  m eet the  challenges posed by the com­
plex application carrier. The m odel-based approach reduces the  em bedded FD 
software developm ent effort since it is also used to  generate code. As the model- 
based approach is relatively well-established, the  FD m ethod is the  central them e 
in FINESSE.
Diagnostic models of complex system s usually allow for m any diagnostic solu­
tions, ordered in term s of probability, while only one of the  solutions reflects the 
actual system  health  (e.g. the  com bination of H W  com ponent X and SW  com­
ponent Y is unam biguously a t fault). In order to  radically improve FD accuracy 
com pared to  the current state-of-the-art, the  project proposes to  (1) improve the 
quality  of the probabilistic diagnosis ranking process, and (2) to  significantly de­
crease the num ber of diagnosis solutions. To address the former, an improved 
fault probability  modeling m ethod is developed to  estim ate the a priori proba­
bility of faults occurring in software com ponents, which is much more complex 
th an  hardw are com ponent fault probability  modeling. To address the  la tte r, an 
improved FD algorithm  is developed which includes the ability to  reason over 
tim e a t low-cost as well as to  autom atically  generate test vectors as p a rt of the 
diagnostic reasoning process.
The FD approach will be im plem ented in term s of an existing, m odel-based 
tool set based on T U D ’s system  modeling language Lydia, and validated on a 
paper handling system  (PHS) of Oce in term s of a dem onstrator. The issues th a t 
will be investigated include the adequacy of the new FD approach to  improve 
system  dependability  during operations, the  effort spent in modeling, the  com­
puta tional costs of the  FD  approach, all com pared to  trad itional techniques, as 
well as architectural developm ent topics such as the  added (dependability) value 
of improved sensor placem ent, and improved testab ility  features.
Results No result yet: the  project ju s t s tarted .
Utilization A part from Oce and LogicaCM G, the im pact of the  research is ex­
pected to  be very high. M any m anufacturers th a t produce complex hardw are­
software artifacts perform ing functions w ith a high economic added value an d /o r 
which are life-critical, are facing trem endous problem s w ith respect to  system s 
dependability, and have trad itionally  spent a huge effort on devising FD mech­
anisms. O n a national scale examples can be found a t industries such as ASML,
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Philips (Medical Systems, Consum er Electronics, Sem iconductors), ap art from 
Oce.
4 C onclusions
Boosted by the  advent of UML and MDA, the role of models during the design, 
im plem entation, verification and validation of em bedded system s has become 
much more im portan t in recent years. This is a very positive developm ent which 
indicates th a t very slowly em bedded system  design is becoming a m ature  en­
gineering discipline. Commercial tools for model driven development, such as 
Rational Rose, R hapsody and visualSTATE, have gained popularity  prim arily  
because they  support autom atic code generation from abstrac t models (various 
variants of S ta teC hart). By developing system s a t a more abstrac t level th a t 
is (more or less) independent of the  specific hardw are platform , reuse becomes 
possible and th is saves money.
Model driven developm ent provides a great opportun ity  to  improve the ver­
ification and validation process through the in troduction of formal techniques. 
The system atic, s truc tu red  construction of models by itself already supports 
validation and verification. In addition, the fact th a t models are available in m a­
chine readable form enables the  application of a whole range of (m athem atical) 
techniques for analysis such as theorem  proving, model checking, model based 
testing  and runtim e verification. These techniques are still far from m ain stream  
technology at the m om ent, bu t play an increasingly im portan t role in certain  
niche areas [27]. Their economic value is certainly dem onstrated  in those cases.
A general cost/benefit analysis and com parison to  o ther approaches are sel­
dom m ade or are a t best very lim ited in scope [25]. One of the  problem s is 
th a t the whole area is subject to  so much change: by the  tim e you have m ade a 
cost/benefit analysis it is outdated . We have e.g. seen enorm ous progress on for­
mal verification tools during recent years: scalability, accessibility, convenience 
and realizability have all been drastically  improved. A nother issue was raised by 
G errit Muller a t a recent ForTIA  m eeting [27]. He conjectured th a t (at least at 
the system  design level) the added value of formal m ethods are prim arily  the 
skills of the  people using them : they  are analytical, s tructured , firm in princi­
ple and consistent. Using these skills, these individuals can play an im portan t 
role in an informal m ulti-disciplinary process, bu t not necessarily using m athe­
m atical models or applying rigorous analysis techniques. I believe th a t M uller’s 
conjecture is wrong (and hope th is paper has provided enough evidence for this): 
m aking formal models is a great way of finding am biguities/m istakes in designs, 
and symbolic calculation/search by formal verification and validation tools also 
helps to  find m any more nontrivial bugs. Nevertheless, if one tries to  make an ob­
jective assessment of the  benefits of formal verification and validation m ethods, 
the issue raised by Muller is of course very relevant.
Form al verification is one of the tool boxes th a t can (and sometimes has to) 
be used in the  construction of em bedded system s. In m any situations application 
of formal verification is not (yet) cost-effective, bu t in m any other situations it
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does pay off. The challenge is to  recognize these situations. Right now w ithin 
m ost D utch companies in the em bedded system s area there is not too  much 
knowledge about formal verification technology, although certainly initiatives 
such as PRO G RESS and ESI have helped to  improve things. Still, m ost com­
panies do not realize how im portan t it is for their own success to  be experts on 
V&V. It is essential to  have a t least a rough feeling concerning w hat formal ver­
ification and validation can and cannot do. W ith in  D utch Universities there is 
much expertise on formal m ethods and either directly  or th rough organizations 
such the L aboratory  for Q uality  Software (LaQuSo, h ttp ://w w w .la q u so .c o m ) 
of the  Universities of Eindhoven and Nijmegen, th is expertise can be easily used. 
W hen I com pleted m y PhD  thesis in 1990, the typical duration  for a formal ver­
ification case study  was one year. Due to  advances in the field it is now often 
possible to  get the first results after one week (depending on the  case study, 
of course). Big companies such as Intel, Siemens, IBM  Lucent and Microsoft 
have dedicated groups working on the developm ent and application of formal 
verification technology. W ith in  the N etherlands verification specialists are ac­
tive w ithin e.g. Philips, Im tech and Chess. My im pression is th a t Pentium  bug 
style disasters will be needed to  convince D utch companies to  set up full-fledged 
formal verification groups. M aybe the  situation  will change w ithin a few years 
due to  increased use of model driven development, the  fact th a t formal verifica­
tion technology becomes more and more powerful, and the in tegration of model 
driven developm ent w ith formal verification technology.
There appears to  be a big difference in m ental a ttitu d e  in the hardw are 
and in the software community. In the  former, the  use of formal techniques is 
well established, possibly because product liability claims are of real economic 
significance. In the software community, p roduct liability is typically waived 
and the end-users still seem to  accept th a t fact. Q uite likely, the  uptake of 
formal m ethods in m ain stream  software engineering is hindered by th a t. There 
is evidence th a t in the area of em bedded software, where the borderline between 
hard- and software is inherently  less obvious, th is a ttitu d e  is in fact changing 
[27]. The quality  dem ands posed on those type of systems, for example in the 
autom otive dom ain, are typically identical to  hardw are, and product liability 
is indeed a real concern here, which raises the need for system  verification and 
validation.
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